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1 ABSTRACT 
Urban life increasingly depends on intact critical infrastructures (CIs). For this reason, protecting critical 
infrastructure systems from natural disasters and man-made hazards has become an important topic in urban 
development research in recent years as a prerequisite for building and optimizing smart cities. To increase 
efficiency, the connections between CIs have been strengthened increasingly, resulting in highly 
interdependent large-scale infrastructure systems that are vulnerable to cascading failures. Hence, studying 
the cascading and feedback effects caused by the failure of a CI component in a given system can help 
strengthen this system. Understanding the response of the system in the event of a disaster can lead to better 
disaster management and better planning of critical infrastructures in the future. The population heavily 
depends on water, electricity, and the transportation network. These three components also depend on each 
other to function individually. This complex nature of interdependencies must be studied in order to 
understand the effects induced in one system due to the failure of another.  
The three systems (water, transport, and electricity) and their interdependencies can be modeled using graph 
theory. Water, transport, and electricity networks can be further broken down into smaller components. For 
example, the water network comprises water treatment plants, water storage tanks, pumping stations, sewage 
treatment, etc. interdependency factors into the model when, for instance, a pumping station depends on 
electricity. Graph theory can be used to depict the pairwise relationship between the individual components. 
Each node in the graph represents a critical infrastructure and the edges between these critical infrastructures 
represent their dependency. The modeled graph is a multigraph (inter-network dependency) and 
multidirectional (mutual dependence of two or more components). The idea behind building this model is to 
simulate the response of the interdependent systems upon failure. Building a simulation tool with an 
underlying interdependency graph model can not only help in understanding the failure response, but can 
also help in building a robust system for preserving the infrastructures. The data obtained from the 
simulation results will contribute to a better emergency response in the event of a disaster.       
The failure response of a system depends largely on the failed component. Hence, three cases are considered 
to simulate and identify the state of the system upon failure of a component: The failed component can be a 
node with maximum outward dependencies, a node with maximum inward dependencies, or a random failure 
of a component. If a component has the maximum number of outward edges, the simulation tool will help 
visualize the cascading effects, whereas a system with the maximum number of incoming edges will 
contribute to the understanding of the feedback response as the outward nodes are not affected immediately. 
Another goal of CI failure analysis is to develop an algorithm for the partial restoration of specific critical 
services when a CI is not working at full capacity. The selection of critical infrastructure components for 
restoration is based on the number of people being affected. 
2 INTRODUCTION 
Maintaining essential public services such as access to mobility, electricity, and water is directly connected 
to the intact function of the necessary CIs. CIs are technologically complex systems with numerous 
intersectoral interdependencies. Damaging events within an infrastructure system or sector can lead to 
failures cascading onto connected systems and sectors. This causes hard-to-predict damage propagation 
which endangers the population’s security of supply. We have therefore developed a framework of systemic 
and intersectoral dependencies between linked infrastructures for the sectors water, transport, and power 
supply. This framework combines input-output modeling with graph theory techniques to simulate cascading 
failures, to support policy makers and infrastructure operators, and to make large-scale systems more 
resilient towards natural, technological, and man-made disasters. 
Our framework is a prototype that can be expanded by additional CI sectors. The definition of critical 
infrastructure sectors is slightly different for different countries, but most lists of critical systems include 
telecommunications, electric power systems, natural gas and oil, banking and finance, transportation, water 
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supply systems, government services, and emergency services [OUANG 2014]. In an ideal model, all sectors 
should be depicted, but due to the high connectivity of each sector, the complexity of the model rises fast 
with every added infrastructure component, which is why the presented framework is limited to three sectors. 
So far, several techniques for modeling and simulating interdependent CI networks exist that EUSGELD ET 
AL. grouped into eight categories [EUSGELD ET AL. 2008]: agent-based modeling, system dynamics, 
hybrid system modeling, critical path method, high-level architecture and petri nets. OUANG proposed a 
different subdivision in a more recent publication and divides existing modeling and simulation techniques 
into empirical approaches, agent-based approaches, economic-theory-based approaches, network-based 
approaches, and other approaches [OUANG 2014]. 
The model approaches differ both in their requirements regarding the accuracy of the data and in the scale at 
which the networks and cascading failures are depicted. We decided on a network-based approach since 
acquiring usable data to validate the model posed a significant problem during the development of the model, 
as is described in more detail below. The model approach was therefore chosen for its great intrinsic validity, 
as is common for graph models depicting networks. The network topologies which constitute the basis are 
known in detail and can be reconstructed without access to confidential data. Graph-based models 
furthermore come with the advantage that they can simply depict complex systems at a large scale through a 
multigraph. The largely hierarchical structure of infrastructure systems which produce their output centrally 
and then supply their product to local consumers via a wide distribution network can be depicted accurately 
through directed acyclic graphs which are connected at intersectorally dependent nodes. In addition, a 
software-based simulation of the “system of systems” of critical infrastructure sectors can be realized as a 
multigraph at much lower memory capacity and computing time than with more data-intensive solutions 
such as agent-based models. Models explained in the following sections were researched, simulated and 
analyzed in cooperation with Siemens AG. We thank them for the resourceful support they offered in taking 
this work forward.” 
3 GRAPH-BASED MODELING OF CASCADING FAILURES 
According to a widespread definition by RINALDI, CIs are highly connected in multiple ways that can be 
classified as physical, cyber, geographic, and logical interdependencies [RINALDI 2001]. Physical 
interdependencies describe the dependency of one infrastructure on the material outputs of other 
infrastructures. Cyber-interdependencies occur whenever one infrastructure depends on information from 
another infrastructure. Interdependencies on information technology exist in all computer-aided 
infrastructures. Geographic interdependencies are created by the physical proximity of several infrastructures 
to one another, for example two transport infrastructures overlapping, such as a railway bridge and a road. 
Damage to the railway bridge may lead to road closure, which would cancel the redundancy of the two 
physically close systems even though they do not depend on one another physically or in terms of 
information technology. Logical interdependencies describe interdependencies of mechanisms other than 
physical, cyber, or geographic, such as dependencies caused by political or financial circumstances.  
ZIMMERMANN proposes a different approach and groups interdependencies into the categories functional 
and spatial. Functional interdependencies occur where the operation of one infrastructure is necessary for the 
operation of the dependent infrastructure, while spatial interdependencies refer to the proximity between 
infrastructures [ZIMMERMANN 2001]. We refer to this definition as we see physical, cyber-, and logical 
interdependencies as three different types of functional interdependencies that can be modeled the same way, 
while geographical and spatial interdependencies are synonymous and appear fundamentally different in our 
framework.  
Analyzing the fragility of interdependent networks is extremely relevant when it comes to planning resilient 
infrastructures. One fundamental characteristic of interdependent networks is cross-system damage 
propagation. Concerning this issue, BULDYREV ET AL. studied abstract systems. The main result of their 
research was the analytical proof that broad-scale degree distributions that confer resilience in individual 
networks increase the vulnerability of interdependent networks to random failures [BULDYREV ET AL. 
2010].  
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The issue of fragile infrastructure systems was already covered in 2003 in FIKSEL’s study. The author 
focuses on planning inherent resilience in the system design, which is achieved through diversity, efficiency, 
adaptivity and cohesion [FIKSEL 2003].  
In 2006, HOLMGREN suggested using graph theory to model large infrastructure networks. However, he 
limited the application of graph theory to modeling power supply, the structure of which is strictly 
hierarchical [HOLMGREN 2006]. The researchers SVENDSEN and WOLTHUSEN modeled an 
interdependent system using graph-theoretical methods in 2007. Their approach is suitable for assessing the 
stability of a municipal supply system quantitatively. By removing edges from a multigraph, system failures 
at all supply levels can be simulated, allowing users to estimate the damages caused by component failures. 
Since then, graph-theoretical models have continuously been adapted and developed further.  In 2015, 
CHOPRA AND KHANNA published a model to predict disruptions in CI for the economy of the USA 
[CHOPRA AND KHANNA 2015]. GIORGIO AND LIBERATI developed a bayesian network-based 
approach as a continuation of the basic graph-theoretical model [GIORGIO AND LIBERATI 2011, 
GIORGIO AND LIBERATI 2012]. 
Interdependency graph models depict infrastructure components as directed multigraphs which can be 
expanded by additional functions to define the relation between the components [SVENDSEN AND 
WOLTHUSEN 2007]. Each of the components is represented as a node and produces one output each, for 
which it requires the input of another component. If a component is unable to create the required input itself, 
it depends on the higher-ranking, input-providing component. This dependency is depicted as an edge. If the 
input-giving component fails, this causes a failure or impediment of all successive dependent components, 
which is modeled by removing the edge that failed initially and all successive dependent edges. 
Depending on the damage event, a single edge can be removed (e.g. because of an isolated terrorist attack), 
or a geographic area can be defined in which all output fails (e.g. due to floods or fires). One way to stop the 
cascading failures are buffers, i.e. local utilities such as standby generators, or local utilities working 
independently, e.g. water treatment plans generating energy from sewage. In addition, damage propagation 
during a component failure can be prevented. In order to do so, redundant connections to other components 
can be set up, as is the case with the n-1 rule in power transmission. 
Inputs and outputs can be services as well as physical products. Each output constitutes the input for at least 
one other component of the system and must be assigned as the input of a geographic location accordingly. 
When a component is supplied with all its required inputs, it operates normally. If one of the supplying 
components fails, which can be modelled by removing an edge, the component now enters an irregular mode 
of operation, which includes both limited operation and failure. Outputs are provided for geographically 
defined supply areas. The number of people that live or work in each supply area and are affected by a 
cascading failure determines the criticality of the system. 
A general weakness of our model, as well as of all existing infrastructure-interdependency-modeling 
approaches, is that validation is difficult, which is the result of a lack of data available. Three types of data 
are required in order to develop and validate a framework for the depiction of cross-sector infrastructure 
interdependencies and the resulting damage propagation in the event of a failure:  
• Geo-referenced data to depict the position of all infrastructure components to be covered 
• Data about the capacities each infrastructure has, including existing buffers and redundancies that 
exist in the system 
• Data recorded during disasters depicting the actual spread of damages  
Geo-referenced data and infrastructure capacity data for the depiction of local technical infrastructure 
systems is recorded by operators and municipalities, but is highly confidential. Non-confidential geo data 
such as the position of buildings is available from the municipalities, but often at high costs. The third data 
type required for infrastructure system modeling, data on the effects of real disasters, is difficult to generate 
since electronic systems recording such data may be affected by the failure themselves, scientific data 
collection is a low priority in the event of disasters, and conducting experiments on urban infrastructure 
systems essential to supply is impossible [SIMPSON ET AL. 2010]. 
Behaviour Analysis of Interdependent Critical Infrastructure Components upon Failure 
110 
   
REAL CORP 2016: 
SMART ME UP! 
 
 
 
 
4 TOPOLOGY OF THE ELECTRIC POWERSUPPLY NETWORK 
To explain our framework in detail, we have chosen an exemplary part of the electricity supply network 
topology that is linked with parts of the transport sector and industrial facilities, as shown in Figure 1. The 
model has been kept abstract in order to illustrate the dependencies and lay a framework for further analysis. 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of electric power supply network using graph model (Source: Author's own) 
Complex models can be built further  for a comprehensive analysis. As the model is hiearchical, nuclear fuel 
and coal sit on top of the graph model because of their major contribution to the electric power generation in 
Germany [GRAUS AND WORRELL 2009]. Electricity generated from coal or nuclear fuel, is sent to the 
substations for stepping down the voltage for various purposes.  
Although the fuels consumed for power generation is not limited only to nuclear and coal, to keep the model 
simple and understandable we have neglected the remaining fuel sources. Buffers in the graph model 
increase the resilience of the system in times of emergency. The edge connecting the buffer unit and power 
generation unit is bidirectional. The bi-directional nature of the buffer is owed to the fact that the buffer is 
utilized for power generation during emergencies and subsequently restored back when the power generation 
unit is working to its full capacity. The high-voltage lines are stepped down at subsequent substations for 
power distribution. For example, substations which handle high voltage (60 kV to 220 kV) distribute power 
to large-scale industries and to medium voltage substations. Medium-voltage substations handle voltage 
between 6 kV to 60 kV. They distribute electricity to medium-scale industries, light rail transit systems and 
to regional low-voltage substations. Low-voltage substations (230 V to 400 V) are partly also fed by solar 
power generation units. Solar power is fed to the low-voltage substations which consequently feed the end 
users. End users comprise public facilities, commercial enterprises, private households, etc. This completes 
the description of our abstract model representing electrical power supply network. However, it is important 
to note that the network described above is only a small part of the complete multi-graph model. The 
complete multi-graph model describing the network topologies of electricity, transport and water networks is 
a lot more complex. For the graph model described we developed three algorithms to simulate cascading 
failures that will be discussed in the following sub sections. 
4.1 Discrete simulation of disruptions 
For a complex infrastructure system with several interdependencies, initially it is important to understand the 
ramifications. Every interdependent system has few nodes which are majorly responsible for the smooth 
functioning of the system. SHUAI ET AL. and HAVLIN AND KENETT suggested methods for analysis of 
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complex interdependent systems from a network analysis perspective [SHUAI ET AL. 2015, HAVLIN AND 
KENETT 2015]. While SHUAI ET AL. suggested generalized model for understaning the cascading effects 
with changing network topology, degree of nodes and number of nodes, Havlin and Kenett 2015 focused on 
the application of the model suggested by Shuai et al. in economic sector. The insight gained from these 
methods is to identify the size of largest functioning interdependent cluster with changing influential 
parameters (network topology, degree of nodes, and number of nodes) upon failure of a fraction of nodes in 
the model. Cluster is defined as the formation of independent interdependent system upon fragmentation of 
network due to failure. The information obtained from the analysis can be used to model the system based on 
network theory, such that even upon disruption, large part of the network is still functional. But our approach 
is not based on redesigning the existing network topology but making it robust by identifying the nodes 
which carry maximum significance for the uninterrupted running of the major part of our model. This in turn 
can be used to minimize the number of people affected due to cascading failure. As a simple example, failure 
or disruption of a power generation unit would affect all the dependent nodes lying in the same sector as well 
as the transport sector which would not be the case upon failure of a low-voltage substation. Hence, to 
discern and distinguish between the nodes of our complex interdependent model we work with a discrete 
status model. In the discrete model every node has discrete state of operation, either “Running” or “Failed”. 
In the graph model every node has an attribute describing its running status and name. Initially the running 
statuses of all the nodes are marked as “Running”.  
The graph model can be read by the program using GraphML file format. The GraphML parser reads the 
edges, nodes, and their attributes, which can be used for further computation and analysis. The direction of 
an edge is always from head node to tail node as the former is higher in the hierarchical model than the later. 
The program starts by looping over the edges of the graph model. Attributes of the current edge, its head 
node and tail node are stored. If the status attribute of the head node is equal to “Failed” then the attribute of 
the tail node is changed to “Failed”. The program comes to an end with the last edge of the graph model. As 
explained, the rationale behind this approach is to find the critical nodes in the system. Failure criteria such 
as failure of random node, failure of node with maximum-minimum outgoing edges, or failure of maximum-
minimum incoming edges can be selected for the failure of the head node. Vulnerability of an infrastructure 
component can be determined and studied in multiple ways, as has been suggested in several papers 
[EINARSSON AND RAUSAND 1998, GEORGE AND DOUGLAS 2005]. EINARSSON AND 
RAUSAND defined vulnerability of the industrial system as the ability to endure threats and survive 
accidental events that originate from within and outside the system boundaries. GEORGE AND DOUGLAS 
proposed a methodology for ranking the infrastructure components based on performance index, which is the 
sum of the weights of individual performance measures (PM) multiplied by the disutilities of each 
component for that particular PM. Methodology proposed by EINARSSON AND RAUSAND is theoretical 
and can be applied only to industrial systems, whereas GEORGE AND DOUGLAS’s approach is based on 
weight and disutility of performance measures through deliberation in workshops. The approach we chose 
for the graph model analysis is closer to what has been described by JÖNSSON, JOHANSSON AND JOHANSSON 
[JÖNSSON, JOHANSSON AND JOHANSSON 2008]. JÖNSSON, JOHANSSON AND JOHANSSON defined criticality or 
vulnerability of an infrastructure as the magnitude to which the complete interdependent model will be 
affected upon failure. They focussed more on the affect of failure sets rather than individual component 
failures. We divide the total number of nodes (NFi) affected by the failure of a node (Ci) by the total number 
of nodes in the system (N), which indicates the criticality of the failed node. Here, i denotes the infrastructure 
node of interest spanning from 1 to N. 
 
The range of Ci is between 1/N and 1.0 as NFi cannot be greater than N. An analysis can be performed for the 
whole model by iteratively choosing one node after the other. If the criticality of a selected node is (1/N), that 
shows that no other node is dependent on the selected node. A criticality of 1.0 would mean that all the other 
nodes in the system are dependent on the selected node. Table 1 shows the criticality of the nodes in our 
graph model (Figure 1). As the graph model is hierarchical, it can be observed that criticality of node reduces 
as we move down the graph. Node set {N7, N8, N10} has no dependent nodes and hence their criticalities 
are 0.1. This means no further failures in the system takes place due to the failure of these nodes. Although 
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this model is a good starting point for analyzing the graph model, the major drawback is equal weights for all 
the edges. This disadvantage is covered in the continuum model for the simulation of disruptions. 
Failed node 
number 
Criticality of node 
(Ci) 
N1 0.8 
N2 0.8 
N3 0.7 
N4 0.6 
N5 0.5 
N6 0.2 
N7 0.1 
N8 0.1 
N9 0.3 
N10 0.1 
Table 1: Criticality of failed nodes (Source: Author’s own) 
4.2 Continuum model for the simulation of disruptions 
The discrete model discussed above describes the dependency of one infrastructure component on others 
with unweighted edges and a discrete state of operation. But in reality the complete interdependent system 
works dynamically on the basis of many factors as described by BROWN [BROWN 2007]. MIN ET AL. 
described a system dynamic methodology for identifying and quantifying risky nodes and edges and, 
evaluating the effects of system redundancies, the impact of buffers, and the positive/negative impact created 
due to interdependencies [MIN ET AL. 2007]. In general an infrastructure node comprises many independent 
components which are clubbed into one. Power generation node contains power generated from different 
fuels. The nodes can either be split into many individual components or additional edges can be added 
describing the input feed type. If a city generates 10% of the total electricity using renewable resources and 
rest using coal or gas, this means that the edge between power generation and the end user will not have the 
weight same as the edge between solar power and low-voltage substation. In this approach we work with unit 
less working status. The working status (WSi) of a node is always between 0.0 and 1.0. If a node’s working 
status (WSi) is equal to 1.0 that means all the nodes are functioning to full capacity. Here, i denotes the 
infrastructure node of interest spanning from 1 to total number of nodes in the model (N). 
Edge number Weight of 
Edge (Wj) 
E1 0.5 
E2 0.5 
E3 1.0 
E4 1.0 
E5 0.9 
E6 1.0 
E7 1.0 
E8 0.1 
E9 1.0 
Table 2: Weights of edges (Source: Author’s own) 
To ensure that the maximum WSi at which a node can work is 1.0, sum of weights of all the incident edges 
on a node must be equal to 1.0. This means that edge E8 would have a weight of 0.1 and edge E5 would have 
a weight of 0.9, under the assumption that 10% of electricity is generated from solar power and 90% from 
coal, gas etc.The criticality approach chosen for the continuum model is slightly different from the discrete 
model. In this approach, the failure of a node is described by the weight of the edge. Fehler! Verweisquelle 
konnte nicht gefunden werden. Table 2 describes the weights of all the edges when the system is working 
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at full capacity. The working status of a node is calculated by multiplying the weight of the edge with the 
working status of its head node. If a node has failed completely, we mark the working status of the node as 
0.0 and iterate over all the remaining nodes to calculate the working status of every other node based on the 
formula: 
 
Here, j is the index of the edge connecting the ith node to the kth node where the ith node is dependent on the 
kth node and M is the total number of edges incident on the ith node. After the calculation of the working 
status of all the nodes upon failure of a node, the criticality of a node is calculated on the basis of the 
following formula: 
 
A failure analysis for every node is performed and the criticality of every node is noted in Table 3. An 
adjacency matrix with working status can be constructed as described by CHOPRA AND KHANNA 
[CHOPRA AND KHANNA 2015]. Such an approach is used mainly in supply-demand models for 
identifying final demand due to a disruption. The criticality of nodes calculated using the continuum model is 
a better approximation than the discrete model due to its ability to analyse partial failure along with complete 
failure. It is possible that a fraction of infrastructure has failed unlike the test case we chose. In such a 
scenario the weights of the edges will help in identifying the current state of operation of dependent nodes. 
Failed node 
number 
Criticality of node 
(Ci) 
N1 0.44 
N2 0.44 
N3 0.68 
N4 0.58 
N5 0.48 
N6 0.2 
N7 0.1 
N8 0.1 
N9 0.12 
N10 0.1 
Table 3: Criticality of failed nodes (Source: Author’s own)  
Table 3 shows that N4 (power generation) is the most critical node in our model. This establishes the 
rationale behind adding buffers to N4. The present continuum model establishes a good strategy for 
analysing the functional dependency.      
4.3 Spatial dependency coupled with functional dependency 
The models discussed above describe the functional dependence of one infrastructure on the other. In this 
model we satisfy spatial dependence on the basis of proximity between infrastructures. Different methods for 
risk assessment of georeferenced data have been proposed by SUMATHIPALA AND WIJESEKERA, 
STEPNOWSKI AND KULAWIAK, KULAWIAK AND LUBNIEWSKI [SUMATHIPALA AND 
WIJESEKERA 2008, STEPNOWSKI AND KULAWIAK 2010, KULAWIAK AND LUBNIEWSKI 2014, 
RIEGEL ET AL. 2015]. Based on the criticality or vulnerability of an infrastructure, a distance based 
function can be defined to assess the spatial impact. Such an analysis has already been suggested by 
STEPNOWSKI AND KULAWIAK. The model they proposed can be used for understanding independent 
infrastructure components upon attack but not for interdependent infrastructures. We have chosen a different 
approach for identifying cascading effects as STEPNOWSKI AND KULAWIAK do not take functional 
dependency into account. The functional dependence describes the relationships between infrastructures. 
Spatial data can be visualized using geo referenced data pointing to the infrastructures on the real map. The 
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graph model is a layer describing the functional dependence which is supplied to the georeferenced layer in 
order to satisfy spatial dependence. Spatial dependence gives an in detail understanding of one to many 
relationships. This kind of relationship is important because in principle a high-voltage substation node can 
have many high-voltage substation infrastructures on the georeferenced map which are dependent on a single 
power generation infrastructure. Actually we move on from a macro model to a micro model using the 
relationships.  
 
Figure 2: Visualization of cascading failure due to failure of a power generation component (Source: Author’s own) 
For the macro model and functional dependence model, we work with the graph model. In the case of 
functional dependence model coupled with the spatial dependence model, we work with shapefiles along 
with the graph model. Shapefiles contain the georeferenced data for every infrastructure with spatial 
coordinates. We are dealing with a relatively simple interdependent system. Hence, dependence between the 
components of an infrastructure and another can be obtained through survey. Moving on to a complex model 
would require us to establish a framework for the tail node component to identify its head node. A distance 
based approach can be used to identify the head infrastructure for each dependent infrastructure. This one-to-
many relationship is achieved by finding out the nearest head node for every tail node. 
A shapefile is used for storing the geographic coordinates, shapes, and attributes of geographic features. 
Shapes represent the physical form of the geographic infrastructure component for visualization. A simple 
example is representation of light rail using lines, municipalities using polygons and industries using points. 
The end goal is to identify the number of people affected by the cascading failures induced upon failure of a 
particular infrastructure. The number of people affected is directly proportional to the criticality of failed 
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infrastructure. Figure 2 shows the cascading effects induced in the interdependent model due to functional 
and spatial dependency. When running the model, the disruption starts with the failure of a component in the 
power generation unit. All the high-voltage substation components dependent on the failed power generation 
infrastructure fail. This leads to the selective failure of medium-voltage substations, industries, light rail and 
low-voltage substation on the basis of spatial proximity. Figure 2 (top) shows the georeferenced 
infrastructures up until medium-voltage substations and Figure 2 (bottom) shows all the georeferenced 
infrastructures in our model. In order to satisfy functional dependency, we have worked with the discrete 
model as we want to establish a simple framework which can be later extended to the continuum model.  
5 CONCLUSION 
Understanding and analysing interdependent critical infrastructures has become an area of interest for 
minimizing the number of people affected by infrastructure failures. The methods proposed facilitate the 
identification of vulnerable interdependent technical infrastructures. A discrete simulation model was 
explained initially to underline the importance of edge weights in the interdependent graph model. The 
discrete model is not a precise method for analysis of critical nodes due to the assumptions that edges do not 
carry any weight and state of operation is discrete. This led to development of continuum model where we 
analyse the system to a greater detail by understanding the constituents of infrastructures and their supply of 
resources to the dependent nodes. The continuum model ensures that the weights of the edges are accounted 
for the calculation of working status. The working status in turn would help us in calculating criticality of the 
nodes. Criticality of the nodes was considered for ranking the critical infrastructure components. The 
identified critical infrastructure was connected to a buffer to increase the resilience of system upon failure. 
Discrete and continuum models explain the dynamics of cascading failure based on the functional 
dependency. Continuum model can be extended from single infrastructure failure to multi infrastructure 
failure based on spatial proximity. This would help us in gaining insight not only from a functional failure 
perspective but also on an attack based failure perspective.       
To quantify the number of people affected by an infrastructure failure, spatial dependence model was 
introduced. RIEGEL ET AL. proposed an approach to determine the number of people affected due to an 
infrastructure failure based on spatial proximity but the coupled model proposed by us defines a relationship 
between the functional dependency model and spatial dependency model using the real geographical co-
ordinates of the infrastructures. This coupling enables us to identify the cascading effects on infrastructures 
at a micro level, pointing to their real geographical coordinates. Functional dependence model and spatial 
dependence model is one way coupled. Changes made to functional dependence model would reflect in the 
micro level but the vice versa is not true. Need for a two way coupled model does not arise as functional 
model does not depend on the micro level model for its operation. Micro level model can be used to identify 
and strengthen weak links at micro level. Analysing and strengthening weak links at macro level would add 
unoptimized redundancy to the system. The models proposed can be used for strategic analysis and urban 
planning so that the number of people affected by such failures is kept at minimum. In the future work, we 
will investigate the conceptual Bayesian network, which will help in the bottom up analysis of the 
hierarchical model. Another scope for future work would be, to establish a framework in order to identify 
shortest path between two critical infrastructures in multi graph model based on DIJKSTRA’s algorithm 
[DIJKSTRA 1959]. The information gained from this framework can be used in restoration of critical 
infrastructures falling in the shortest path first upon disruption.  
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